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connection between a military-intensive fiscal policy stance and the lack of political
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democratic governance.
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Tables and figures appear at the end of this paper1
Effective states have learned how to maintain their legitimacy, and their
legitimacy helps keep them effective. (Goldsmith 2000: 18)
Introduction
Fiscal policy in Burundi and Rwanda poses particular challenges to national leadership
as well as the donor community. These two countries are poor and have been plagued
by chronic ethnic conflicts since the eve of their independence.1 The ethnic crisis of the
early 1990s has resulted in the collapse of the economy and has weakened
administrative capacity. Fiscal crisis has been, by and large, a result of the crisis of
production and trade. While Rwanda is slowly rebuilding its economy and its tax base,
Burundi continues to slump into economic distress as violence continues amid sluggish
peace negotiations.
One of the most challenging tasks of fiscal policy is the management of public
expenditures. First, authorities must allocate public money between capital expenditures
and recurrent expenditures. Second, they must decide on the allocation of funds between
military expenditures and civilian expenditures. This decision poses particular
challenges in countries in conflict or evolving from conflict like Rwanda and Burundi.
Military expenditures typically increase during conflict and tend to remain high even
after conflict is apparently resolved. At the same time, revenues are low during and after
conflict. This implies that higher military expenditures are afforded at the expense of
lower investment in socially productive sectors and higher budget deficits.
The relationship between military expenditures and conflict is complex and can run both
ways. During conflict, military expenditures rise as governments build up their security
apparatus to restore domestic security. The buildup of the military apparatus can
precede conflict as governments preemptively prepare for potential external aggression
or internal dissidence. In turn, high military expenditures may indirectly fuel conflict in
the context of an ethnically polarized political system. When the political system is
dominated by a particular ethnic group or region, as it is the case in Burundi and
Rwanda, the expansion of the military apparatus affects the balance of power among
social groups. A stronger military implies higher political leverage for the ruling group
and further alienation for the disenfranchised segments of the population, especially
when the security apparatus is used for repressive and oppressive purposes.
Consequently, the military buildup can increase the social divide and indirectly fuel
conflict.
High military expenditures also have important implications for discrimination with
regard to access to national resources. In Burundi and Rwanda, like in other labor-
surplus countries, the military constitutes a source of lucrative employment. If access to
the military is restricted along ethnic or regional lines, expansion of the military implies
expansion of employment opportunities only for members of the ethnic or regional
entities in power. This form of discrimination can cultivate frustration and discontent,
thereby worsening the social divide.
1 For a background on ethnic conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda, see, among others, Prunier (1995),
Lemarchand (1994), and Reyntjens (1995a, 1995b).2
This paper investigates various ways in which fiscal policy relates to conflict and
discusses the role of fiscal policy in post-conflict reconstruction and poverty reduction
in the cases of Burundi and Rwanda. Section 1 examines the scope and magnitude of the
macroeconomic and fiscal crisis. During the 1990s, Burundi and Rwanda have
experienced both political crisis and economic distress. However, the evidence suggests
that the economic crisis predates the onset of the ethnic conflicts of the early 1990s.
These conflicts have exacerbated the economic decline whose causes are inherent to the
structural weakness of these economies and political instability arising from
ethnicization of the political process.
Section 2 discusses the motivations for high military expenditures by a regime that must
choose between military expenditures and productive investment. The section discusses
the role of state legitimacy and incentive structures for expenditure management and tax
policy. In the absence of the appropriate “carrots and sticks”, a narrow-based regime
optimizes by selecting a combination of high military expenditures and low social
expenditures. In the long run, economic growth is retarded and the country is caught in
a “militarized poverty trap”.
Section 3 examines how aid, debt, and debt relief relate to fiscal policy in post-conflict
reconstruction. Rebuilding the economy after conflict necessitates a sizeable influx of
foreign aid and a reduction of the debt burden. However, the benefits from increased aid
flows and debt relief largely depend on how the funds are allocated and how they are
managed. It is imperative that an important share of international assistance be allocated
to poverty reduction programs and to rebuilding economic infrastructure. Moreover,
reconstruction programs will be sustainable only if external funding stimulates (i.e.,
“crowds in”) domestic resource mobilization instead of substituting (i.e., “crowding
out”) domestic resources (Boyce 2000).
Section 4 discusses the role of fiscal policy for poverty alleviation and highlights recent
policy developments in Burundi and Rwanda. The current Rwandan regime has taken
important steps toward fiscal policy reform that promise to yield positive results in the
near future. However, the task ahead is still enormous. The situation in Burundi is more
complex; the picture is bleak for the near future unless a viable negotiated settlement to
civil war is reached soon.
Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main findings and highlights the main policy
implications.
1 Anatomy of a macro-fiscal crisis
1.1 Aggregate macroeconomic performance
The decade of the 1990s has been characterized by both a deterioration of the politico-
social conditions and the acceleration of economic decline in Burundi and Rwanda.
However, the evidence shows that the decline in economic performance predates the
onset of the 1993 ethnic crisis in Burundi and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. To a large
extent, the causes of the decline in economic performance are structural; ethnic3
upheaval amplified economic decline in the context of an already fragile
macroeconomic environment.
After a relatively steady growth in the second half of the 1970s, income in Rwanda has
declined since the early 1980s (Figure 1). From 1970 to 1979, per capita GDP increased
by about 2% annually. The following decade, the growth rate dropped to 0.25% before
turning negative (-5%) in the 1990s. The decline in income was exacerbated by the
1994 genocide as agriculture and manufacturing production collapsed. Per capita
income declined by a record 40%, from $225 in 1993 to just $154 in 1994 (Table 1).
Since 1995, income has increased as agricultural production resumed following the
resettlement of the internally displaced population and the return of refugees starting in
1996.
In Burundi, income has stagnated since the 1970s and started to decline in the early
1990s (Figure 1 and Table 2). The ongoing ethnic crisis that started in October 1993 has
prolonged and exacerbated the downfall of output. Unlike earlier episodes of ethnic
violence (like in 1972) that caused only a temporary shocks to output, the current
conflict has caused a larger decline in production because it has lasted longer and
therefore prevented economic recovery.
The ethnic crisis in Burundi and Rwanda has negatively affected all sectors of the
economy, especially those that rely most on high technology and skilled labor as well as
export-oriented activities (IMF, 2000a). For example, output in the transport and
telecommunication sector in Rwanda declined by over three-fourths in 1994.
Manufacturing production decreased by 35% in 1993 in Burundi, and by 35% in 1994
in Rwanda. Agricultural exports declined by 73% in 1994 in Rwanda and by 20% in
1993 in Burundi, while coffee exports plunged by 94% in 1994 in Rwanda and by 43%
in Burundi.2
However, as pointed out earlier, the decline in production on the aggregate and sectoral
levels preceded the ethnic crisis of the 1990s and was only worsened by it. As Figure 2
shows, food production in Rwanda was basically stagnant in the 1980s, and started
declining towards the end of the decade. In Burundi, the crisis has reversed the slow but
steady increase in food production experienced from the 1980s. While food production
is increasing since 1995 in Rwanda due to improvement in internal security, it is still
declining in Burundi as a result of poor security conditions.
1.2 Fiscal crisis
1.2.1 Low and falling fiscal revenues
Just like aggregate economic decline, the fiscal revenue crisis in Burundi and Rwanda
does not originate from the ethnic crises of the 1990s. There are three important
2 The statistics reported here should be interpreted with caution. The data on production is generally
plagued by severe measurement problems. Food production, part of which is non-market production,
is subject to even more measurement problems than production of export crops.4
categories of factors that contributed to the revenue crisis: structural factors, policy and
institutional factors, and the effects of civil war.
The two main structural factors that constrain tax revenues in these two countries are the
weakness of domestic aggregate demand and the lack of diversification of the
production system. In both countries, incomes are so low that the amount of taxes that
can be potentially levied without discouraging consumption and investment is naturally
low. The manufacturing and cash crop sectors are the key generators of tax revenue.
Underdeveloped before the crisis, the manufacturing sector suffered a major setback due
to ethnic violence. The cash crop sector has not recovered from the crisis. Because of
the lack of diversification, tax revenue is heavily dependent on taxation of international
trade, which constitutes over 20% of current revenue (Table 3). Since the 1980s, trade
tax revenues have declined as a result of the decline in both the volume of trade and the
average rate of taxation on international trade (see Figure 3 for Burundi).3 This implies
that measures intended to lower tariffs in the context of trade liberalization may further
depress government revenues at the same time that these two countries need higher
government resources to finance reconstruction programs.
With respect to the fiscal impact of conflict, Burundi and Rwanda differ significantly
from other ‘post-conflict’ countries whose export earnings are less dependent on labor-
intensive products (like agriculture) and more dependent on capital-intensive products
(like minerals and oil). In mineral or oil exporting conflict-prone countries (like the
Republic of Congo), export revenues are likely to fluctuate less following population
displacement. In such countries, tax revenues from international trade will be less
affected by conflict and fiscal recovery will be easier after conflict than in the case of
agriculture-dependent countries like Burundi and Rwanda.
The institutional constraint to fiscal revenue creation in Burundi and Rwanda is twofold.
First, these countries have weak tax administration capacity. They lack both skilled
manpower and the appropriate technology for collecting taxes. Second, both systems
appear to be excessively lenient, granting widespread tax exemptions to public
enterprises, diplomatic missions, non-governmental organizations, and private investors
often on questionable grounds. In 1997, tariff exemptions in Burundi amounted to 21%
of total imports (IMF, 2000b: 22).4 These exemptions carry a high opportunity cost
given that taxes on imports represent a large fraction of total fiscal revenues: about 12%
of total revenues in Burundi and 23% in Rwanda in 1998. The Rwandan new regime has
embarked on major reforms of the fiscal system that include, among other measures, a
significant reduction in tax exemptions (IDA and IMF 2000). These measures should
improve tax collection in the coming years.
The third factor that contributes to the fiscal revenue crisis in Burundi and Rwanda in
recent years is the ethnic conflicts that have disrupted economic activity. Following the
genocide in Rwanda, not only the tax base collapsed, but also tax administration
capacity was eroded. In 1994, the volume of taxes collected declined by a staggering
3 The data on taxes for Rwanda are missing for the 1980s. But the data for the 1970s and the 1990s
indicate that the tax-to-trade volume ratio has decline even more for Rwanda than for Burundi (see
Table 3).
4 Exemptions to unspecified beneficiaries represented 29% of total exemptions in 1997. These are
exemptions to entities other than diplomatic missions, government entities, NGOs, and “investments”.5
75%, including a 81% decline in individual income tax and excise tax and a 70%
decline in tax on international trade (IMF 2000a: 72). With the resumption of
production following improvement in internal security, tax revenue has recovered
progressively, reaching and exceeding the pre-genocide level (Table 4).
In Burundi, the economic embargo imposed on the Buyoya regime following the July
1996 military coup had severe effects on government revenue by reducing the volume
of international trade.5 The volume of taxes on international trade declined by 41% in
absolute terms and by 34% as a percentage of GDP (IMF 2000b: 21). Tax revenue is
likely to continue to decline as long as political instability prevails.
1.2.2 Public expenditures: a crisis of (mis)allocation
In examining the expenditure dimension of the fiscal crisis, we must pay attention not
only to the levels and trends of government expenditures, but also and most importantly
to the distribution of expenditures across sectors. From a sub-Saharan African (SSA)
standard, Burundi and Rwanda do not stand out as having oversized governments
compared to other countries in conflict or evolving from conflicts. Total public
expenditures in Burundi and Rwanda are lower than the average for the SSA region
(Table 6).6
The fiscal crisis in Burundi and Rwanda has been characterized by a marked shift in the
allocation of resources away from capital and social expenditures towards
military/security expenditures. Burundi and Rwanda have among the highest ratios of
military expenditures to total government expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa (Tables 6
and A2). Military expenditures exploded in the 1990s due to ethnic violence (Figure 4).
In Rwanda, the increase in military spending was sparked by the invasion by the
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1990. From an average of just over 5,000 in the 1980s,
the army personnel increased to 30,000 in 1991 (World Bank 2000a). Military
expenditures increased by 122% in 1990 and 41% in 1991 (Table 4).
The outbreak of violence in 1993 in Burundi also caused an increase in military
spending. The military personnel increased by 31% in 1994, 29% in 1995, and a record
40% in 1997. The share of military expenditures in government expenditures rose from
an average of 7% in the 1980s to 12.5% in 1994 and continued to increase by about
20% annually over the 1994-1997 period.
The heavy investment in the defense apparatus has come at great economic and social
costs, especially marked by a large decline in capital expenditures. Capital expenditures
in Burundi declined by 22% in 1994, 33% in 1995, and 45% in 1997. As a result of the
economic embargo in 1996 and the ensuing general deterioration of the economy, both
5 For details on the context, motivation, and effects of the economic embargo, see Ndikumana (2000).
6 In general, SSA countries do not have larger governments than countries in other developing regions.
Table A1 in the appendix presents various indicators of government expenditures, size, and revenues.
SSA’s averages are not systematically higher or lower than those of other regions. Goldsmith (2000)
finds that while African governments are not larger than in other developing countries, they do tend to
perform much below their capacity and “leave many important things undone.” Nonetheless, the fact
that African states are as inefficient as other states in other developing regions gives little comfort for
the large majority of the population that lacks access to basic social services.6
domestic and foreign funding of capital expenditures dried up. The volume of domestic
funding declined by 59% while external funding dropped by 29% (IMF 1997: 20).
Capital expenditures in Rwanda were at an all-time low of 16% of total government
expenditures in 1994, down from an average of about 33% in the 1980s (Table 4).
Under the post-genocide regime, capital expenditures have increased steadily.
Another important aspect of fiscal policy that merits attention is the management of the
civil service. Ethnic conflict has resulted in massive losses in human capital. In
rebuilding the civil service, these countries must pursue two equally important and
interdependent objectives. The first is to promote discipline, professionalism, and
competence in the civil service. This may involve redesigning incentive structures,
including compensation schemes, to make public sector jobs attractive to skilled
workers. The second objective is to depoliticize public employment practices by
instituting hiring and promotion procedures that are based on merit, transparency, and
equal opportunity for all citizens. While overrepresentation of particular ethnic groups
in state employment may be common in sub-Saharan Africa, this practice has been
carried to an extreme in Burundi and Rwanda. In the pre-conflict period, discrimination
in public employment disenfranchises certain segments of the population, alienating
them from the economic system. The Tutsi under the Hutu regimes in Rwanda and the
Hutu in Burundi throughout the post-independence period were subject to this
discriminatory practice in public employment. Alienated segments of the population can
be easy targets for political mobilization by opposition movements, which can fuel
social tensions and even generate violence in the absence of peaceful mediation
mechanisms. In contrast, equitable public employment policies can serve as a tool for
reconciliation and a signal of the end of the era of political exclusion. Equity is a critical
element of social justice and can serve as a credible sign of commitment to peace
building on the part of the post-conflict regime.
Government expenditures in social sectors are lower in Burundi and Rwanda compared
to other African countries (Tables 6 and A2 and Figure 4). For the 1985-1997 period,
expenditures on education represented 2.9% and 3.3% of total government expenditures
in Burundi and Rwanda, respectively. The average for SSA was 4.9% for the same
period. Expenditures on health also are low and basically stagnant since the 1970s.
Because of low investment in social sectors, the coverage of social needs is mediocre in
both countries. A large fraction of the population does not have access to health care,
drinking water, and other basic needs. Burundi and Rwanda have low primary school
enrollment rates compared to other developing countries. In Burundi primary
enrollment declined drastically since the beginning of the ongoing conflict. The ratio
declined from 54% in 1990 to just 38% in 1995 and 36% in 1997. Primary enrollment is
higher in Rwanda (70% in 1995) and it has been higher even in the past: In 1980 and
1990, the rate was 59% and 66% for Rwanda, compared to 20% and 54% for Burundi.
While the enrollment rates are rising in Rwanda with the improvement in security, no
progress can be made in Burundi as long as violence continues.
1.2.3 Macroeconomic consequences of fiscal imbalances
In the 1990s, Burundi and Rwanda have experienced large budget deficits (Tables 4 and
5). From 1992 to 1997, the deficit increased from -5% to -14% in Rwanda. To meet
higher spending, governments have resorted to higher monetary financing of the deficit.
The Burundian government frequently forced the Central Bank to loosen monetary7
policy rules and to keep interest rates artificially low to ease government borrowing
from the banking sector. In 1997, the financing of government budget was based on an
increase in the statutory limit of government advances from the central bank from 10%
to 25% of previous year’s revenue (IMF 1997: 11). The monetization of the deficit has
added upward pressure on inflation, already fueled by supply-side bottlenecks due to the
collapse of production and international trade.
2 Fiscal policy in politically fragile societies
2.1 Military expenditures and state legitimacy
An important factor of military-intensive fiscal policy is the lack of political legitimacy
of the state. A state that lacks political legitimacy has strong incentives to invest in the
security apparatus, which is used to oppress, suppress, and repress the demand for
political openness. State legitimacy need not be contested explicitly to induce high
spending in security. A non-democratic regime is likely to invest in security as a
preemptive measure to position itself favorably in the event of contestation of its power.
The cases of Burundi and Rwanda are unique illustrations of the links between military
expenditures and state legitimacy.7Post-independence regimes lacked legitimacy,
having gained power by force. Second, these regimes were and are still dominated by
one ethnic group and are therefore inherently exclusive. Indeed exclusion along ethnic
lines is a perennial feature of governance in Burundi and Rwanda (see Ndikumana
1998, 2000; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Uvin 1998). Exclusion breeds frustration,
and frustration eventually incites resentment, which can lead to violent opposition in the
absence of peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms. This cycle of exclusion-oppression-
violence is well anticipated by the regime, which preemptively invests in building a
strong repressive apparatus.
Regional monopolization of power is another important feature of post-independence
governance in Burundi and Rwanda. In Burundi, the south has had the monopoly of the
control of the military and the government. The monopolization of the socio-political
system has allowed the South to also control the economy through patronage,
corruption, and rent-seeking (Ndikumana 1998; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000). In
Rwanda, regional monopoly of power was a central feature of the Habyarimana regime.
Access to political and economic privileges was reserved primarily to members of the
akazu (literally meaning “house” or “household”), Habyarimana’s entourage,
predominantly those from Habyarimana’s native prefecture.
The threat to state legitimacy induces increases in military expenditures. Prior to 1990,
Rwanda had a relatively small army. The regime had probably underestimated the
importance of the armed opposition from the exiled Tutsi population, which under the
RPF, proved its military strength during the 1990 invasion. This invasion led the
7 For Rwanda, the foregoing analysis is particularly relevant for the pre-genocide era. There may be
important differences with respect to the international context as well as government’s ideology and
agenda between the pre and post-genocide regimes.8
Habyarimana regime to quickly build up its military. From 1990 to 1994, the size of the
military personnel increased five fold, from 6,000 to 30,000 (World Bank 2000a). In the
past, the Rwandan regime had counted on assistance from its political allies, especially
France, in the case of any attack from outside. It is indeed assistance from France that
eventually saved the regime during the 1990 invasion by the RPF.
Over time, the state legitimacy-military expenditures dynamics can degenerate into a
vicious cycle of high social tension and excessive military spending. As summarized in
Figure 5, a regime that takes power by force inherits questionable rights to rule (thus
lack of legitimacy), causing high insecurity, which induces the regime to invest in
military/security apparatus to maximize its chances of survival. High military
expenditures “crowd out” social spending, creating frustration via deprivation among
the disenfranchised population. Frustration can breed social tension and can serve as a
fertile ground for violent opposition. Opposition induces the incumbent regime to
increase the use of force in suppressing the demand for change, which perpetuates
illegitimacy and high security expenditures. Failure of the incumbent regime to
negotiate with the opposition peacefully or to contain the opposition can result in a
violent change of regime, which sets off yet another cycle of lack of state legitimacy,
high military expenditures, high social tension, instability, and possibly violence.
2.2 Trade-off between security expenditures and social expenditures
A narrow-based regime, whether from an ethnic, regional, religious, or on any other
dimension, often tends to maximize its chances of remaining in power by heavily
investing in security. Such investment is intended to produce “security”, which is a
“good” from the regime’s perspective, but may be a “bad” from the society’s
perspective, especially when security is used for repressive purposes. Expenditures on
security carry a high opportunity cost because they compete with expenditures on
productive infrastructure and social service provision.8
It is important to note that some expenditures classified as “security” may indeed be
helpful in increasing security for the general population. The breakdown of the rule of
law and order has adverse effects on everyone, and can be harmful for the poor who
cannot defend themselves or afford private security. Hence, measures to restore the rule
of law can have a progressive impact. Nevertheless, in the cases of Burundi and
Rwanda, the security of the poor—and the security for all for that matter—has not
necessarily been the motivation for spending on security. The security apparatus usually
serves the interests of the regime, and is often used for repressive purposes.
In the following analysis, expenditures on security/military are considered as
consumption, yielding utility for the regime. The economy produces output, which is
spent on security while the residual is used to finance expansion of social and physical
capital stock. The conditions for optimality are derived to illustrate the behavior of a
8 Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1996) explore the links between military expenditures and economic
performance in a large sample of developing and developed countries. They investigate the benefits of
cuts in military spending for economic growth (“peace dividend”). Their results indicate that these
benefits can be potentially large.9
myopic regime seeking to maximize its chances of survival. The regime maximizes a
utility function which includes military/security expenditure (m) as one of the
arguments. The other arguments are ignored for the sake of simplicity. Social and
physical capital are lumped together into one composite capital stock, h,w h i c h
depreciates at the rate of . d 9 If both the utility function and the production function are
nicely behaved (monotonic and concave) then a solution to the optimization problem
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The solution set to the above problem implies a trade-off between military expenditures
and accumulation of social and physical capital. Typically, a regime with weak
legitimacy tends to choose a situation of high expenditures on security. Consequently,
social capital is depleted following the law of motion in equations (2) and (4). The well
being of the society would be enhanced if the regime chose a situation in which military
expenditures are low and gradually declining, allowing social capital to increase, thus
increasing economic growth. Such a situation is illustrated in the phase diagram in
Figure 6 by point D (for desirable). This figure summarizes the optimality conditions in
equations (4) and (5). Along the vertical line at , ˆ h h = m is constant ( 0 = m  );
m increases ( 0 > m  ) on the left of this line, and m decreases ( 0 < m  )o nt h er i g h to ft h e
line. Along the curve , 0 = h  social capital stock is constant; it increases below this
curve and decreases above this curve.
One important question is how to induce a regime to choose the socially desirable
solution where resources are shifted from military expenditures towards social capital
accumulation. When the regime is facing a binding budget constraint, the negative
effects of military expenditures on social capital are exacerbated, especially because the
9 In practice, allocation of resources between physical capital stock and social services can also be
problematic. Seeking to achieve faster economic growth, governments may choose to allocate
disproportionately high resources into physical infrastructure to the detriment of social services. Such
pro-infrastructure bias can be motivated by a government’s desire to be seen as “strong reformer”,
which earns high marks from international lending institutions.10
government may find it more difficult to obtain external funding for military
expenditures than securing assistance for socially productive investments. The issue
here is ex ante fungibility of aid.10 The regime therefore gives priority to security
expenditures for on-budget expenses, hoping for external funding for social programs.
When the expected external funding for social programs does not materialize, the
country ends up in a high military expenditures-high poverty trap. Note that even when
external assistance is forthcoming, this may induce the regime to further increase
security spending to the detriment of social expenditures, owing to ex post fungibility of
aid. This may cause external funding to dry out in the future if donors find it
unacceptable that their resources are used to fund the buildup of the security apparatus.
Without the right incentive structure, a narrow-based regime is likely to choose a
situation like S (for security-seeking) in Figure 6, where social capital is depleted as the
military/security apparatus is built up. The appropriate incentive structure that can lead
the regime to select a socially desirable combination (m, h) typically includes “carrots”
and “sticks”. Under a narrow-based regime, domestic political pressure plays little role
in the incentive mechanism. If anything, domestic political pressure tends to push the
regime to choose a (high m,l o wh) situation to maximize its force de frappe to contain
the opposition. It is therefore necessary that the “carrots” and “sticks” be engineered or
at least supported by a third party, like the donor community. The donor community has
a high leverage through development aid. The optimal move by the donor community is
not to turn off the resource tap but to use aid to induce socially desirable choices by the
regime in order to enhance social development.
However, the ability of the donor community to influence the behavior of a regime is
constrained by the divergence among individual donors’ preferences and priorities.
Motivations for aid consist of a complex mixture of developmental, humanitarian, and
strategic goals. These goals are donor-specific and may even compete against each other
(see Murshed 2000). The success of post-conflict reconstruction may depend on the
ability of donors to speak with one voice, at least for key issues such as poverty
reduction.
Burundi and pre-genocide Rwanda fit fairly well the model-regime described above.
First, these countries have been ruled by narrow-based regimes, controlled by one ethnic
group, with a high regional concentration of power. Second, these regimes came in
power by force and thus have weak legitimacy. To maximize their chances of survival,
these regimes have typically invested heavily in the military/security apparatus,
especially in the most recent decades as armed opposition increased. This pro-military
attitude has serious negative social consequences and hampers long-run economic
growth.
Governance structures must change in Burundi and Rwanda for these countries to
achieve long-run stability. In Burundi, efforts for a peaceful settlement have produced
few tangible results so far. But a speedy conclusion of the process is definitely not
desirable either if it means overlooking hard questions of power sharing, security,
citizens’ rights, and broad-based development. The case of Rwanda is more complex.
10 See McGillivray and Morrissey (2000) for a survey of the literature on the impact of aid on fiscal
behavior of the government. The authors discuss the issue of aid fungibility as it affects fiscal
behavior.11
While the country is making visible progress in the areas of internal security and
economic reform, the political process remains opaque.
2.3 Tax policy and incentive structure
Tax revenue collection depends, among other things, on three important factors: the
capacity to tax, the incentives to tax, and the incentives to pay tax. The discussion in
Section 1 highlighted the weakness of tax administration capacity in Burundi and
Rwanda, which was exacerbated by ethnic crisis. In this sub-section, incentives to tax
and to pay taxes are discussed in the particular context of the ethnically polarized states
of Burundi and Rwanda to show how bad politics constrains tax collection.
In Burundi and Rwanda as in other countries (developed as well as underdeveloped),
governments seek to maximize tax collection while minimizing the political costs of
taxation. Political costs of taxation include the risk of disenfranchising the political and
business elite on which the regime counts for political support. The pervasive tax
exemptions in Burundi and Rwanda are probably a symptom of the reluctance to levy
tax on political clients. Even when tax laws are officially enacted, they are not
effectively enforced, partly due to political clientelism. From the taxpayer’s side, the
objective is to minimize tax payments. This can be accomplished either by lobbying for
low tax rates or simply through tax evasion. Tax evasion is made easier when the
taxpayer is also a political client for the decision maker. Ultimately tax policy suffers
from conflicts of interest among decision makers.
Effective taxation requires state-society reciprocity in which the population is rewarded
for tax payment via public service delivery. Tax collection is a difficult task, even in
administratively advanced countries. However, tax collection is relatively easier when
the population feels that taxes are used to finance socially productive programs that are
accessible to the larger majority of the people. This requires state institutions that are
owned by the people through a process of democratic governance. Democratic
governance enhances state legitimacy, which in turn can contribute to increasing the
effectiveness of tax collection and public service delivery. As Goldsmith (2000: 18)
puts it, “effective states have learned how to maintain their legitimacy, and their
legitimacy helps keep them effective.” To be effective, fiscal policy reform must go
hand in hand with institutional reform aimed at establishing transparent and accountable
governance structures.
3 External funding and fiscal policy in conflict and post-conflict settings
3.1 Aid flows
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda attracted generosity among the donor community,
materialized by substantial inflows of aid. Official aid increased from $47 per capita in
1993 to $115 in 1994 and $110 in 1995; but the volume of aid has declined since 1996
(Table 4). Note, however, that even during the years leading to the genocide, the
Habyarimana government had received generous amounts of foreign aid (see Figure 8).12
From an average of roughly $230 million per year in the 1980s, official development
aid rose to $356 million per annum in the 1990-1992 period.11 Higher amounts of
foreign aid were flowing in even as evidence on massive abuses against human rights
and deepening social/ethnic division was mounting, in an environment that eventually
set the stage for the 1994 genocide.
The situation in Burundi is different from that of Rwanda in one special respect: the
1993 ethnic crisis attracted little attention from the donor community. The volume of
aid declined since 1994, and dropped further following the 1996 economic embargo
imposed on the Buyoya regime. Without significant external funding, it will be difficult
for these countries to achieve the rates of economic growth that are necessary to raise
the living standards of the population and eventually overcome aid dependency. In its
recent report, the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
concludes that to overcome underdevelopment and aid dependence, Africa will need
higher levels of foreign funding, which can raise national incomes and tax revenues,
thereby reducing the need for further foreign aid in the future (UNCTAD 2000).
Unfortunately, observers often lament the fact that “much of aid continues to go to
middle-income countries that do not need it” (World Bank 1998: 4).
3.2 Debt relief, an important ingredient for reconstruction
As Burundi and Rwanda struggle to overcome the legacy of chronic civil strife and
rebuild their economies, they also face a heavy load of foreign debt. In 1998, the stock
of debt was $1.12 billion for Burundi and $1.23 billion for Rwanda. Debt ratios in these
countries, especially in Burundi, are considerably higher than the average for Sub-
Saharan Africa (Table 7). The average debt stock to GNP ratio for the 1995-1998
period was 119% for Burundi compared to 73% for sub-Saharan Africa. The debt
service to exports ratio for the same period was 39% for Burundi and 20% for Rwanda,
compared to 15% for the sub-continent. External borrowing increased considerably
from the second half of the 1970s and exploded in the 1980s (Table 7 and Figure 8).
From the 1970s to the 1980s, net debt flows increased from an annual average of $18
million to $89 million in Burundi and from $27 million to $64 million in Rwanda. Debt
inflows continued to rise in Rwanda in 1990s, while they declined in Burundi.
The heavy debt burden constitutes a major handicap for development in general. The
issue is even more pressing in the context of post-conflict reconstruction when these
countries need to focus their scarce resources to providing badly needed social services
and rebuilding the economic infrastructure.
Rwanda has made the list of the countries that qualified for debt relief through the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). The debt relief for Rwanda amounts
to $810 million in debt service or a 71% reduction in net-present-value debt. The
country must take advantage of this “millennial” gesture and increase its investment in
economic infrastructure and improve social service provision. However, debt relief must
11 The aid figures reported here are in real 1995 US dollars. Nominal values are converted to real values
using the US producer price index from the International Financial Statistics13
not be considered as a substitute for aid. The country needs sustained aid flows to carry
out its reconstruction efforts.
The case of Burundi poses a peculiar dilemma to the international lending and donor
community. The country is one of the 27 Severely Indebted Low-Income Countries
(SILIC) in sub-Saharan Africa. Its debt ratios are higher than those of Rwanda and
many other African countries that have been approved for debt relief under HIPC (Table
A3). Among the 18 African countries that qualified for debt relief, only Zambia has a
higher debt service to exports ratio than Burundi (59% and 38% respectively), and only
6 countries have a higher total debt to GNP ratio (Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar,
Mauritania, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia). The evidence shows
that Burundi’s debt burden is not sustainable.
Should Burundi qualify for debt relief under special conditions? Does Rwanda deserve
debt relief more than Burundi? These are some of the important questions that the donor
community must confront. However, before Burundi can be considered for debt relief,
some important policy questions must be raised. The most critical question is whether
the current regime in power in Burundi can write a credible proposal for a broad-based
and poverty-reducing development program that deserves support from the international
community. The key word is “broad-based”. The “new” Buyoya regime is definitely not
equipped to fulfill this task. The monolithic military regime is incapable of the
consensus-based decision-making that is necessary for the conception of a broad-based
development agenda. In the absence of a consensus-based governance structure, the
only alternative is a benevolent central authority that can promote a nationalistic
development agenda. Such authority is also inexistent in Burundi for the moment.
So, what should the donor community do in the case of Burundi? In the short run, the
donor community can make a significant difference by supporting the peace negotiation
process. The donor community must come in with a hand that is not only generous with
respect to financial aid but also firm in promoting a responsible attitude on the part of
all leaders in the negotiation process. The leaders must show clear commitment to the
interests of the people and the nation.
4 Fiscal policy, poverty alleviation, and post-conflict reconstruction
In Burundi and Rwanda like in other countries in conflict or evolving from conflict,
fiscal policy must move beyond the conventional goals of macroeconomic adjustment
and countercyclical stabilization and pay more attention to potential effects of fiscal
policy on poverty alleviation. In other words, fiscal policy must have a clear social
mandate. In fact, application of conventional fiscal policy prescriptions may actually
exacerbate poverty in post-conflict countries. In particular, aggressive public
expenditure compression can worsen the poverty situation in the post-conflict episode.
Countries evolving from conflict need to rebuild economic and social infrastructure
damaged by war. The emphasis must be not on reducing government expenditures, but
on the reallocation of public money into socially productive investments (Addison and
Ndikumana 2000). In particular, governments must shift expenditures away from
security/military to revitalize education, health care, and other social services.14
Rwanda has embarked on an economic reconstruction program including important
fiscal reforms.12 The two main objectives of tax reform are to reduce the country’s
dependence on international trade tax and to increase efficiency in tax collection. If
carefully implemented, the steps taken in fiscal reform will prove productive in the near
future. The establishment of the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA) has provided a
framework for improvement in the assessment of tax liabilities and arrears. It is
necessary to preserve and strengthen political and budgetary independence of the RRA
and to maintain efficiency-enhancing incentive mechanisms (higher pay rates and other
indirect benefits) that stimulate effort and accountability for the RRA staff. The
reduction (even cancellation) of tax exemptions will also contribute to improving tax
collection. Along with its efforts to increase revenue collection, the government must
establish specific fiscal incentives to encourage private investment. This can help in the
diversification of the economic activity, thereby broadening the tax base.
A noteworthy feature of the Rwandan reconstruction program is the explicit integration
of poverty reduction monitoring in its budgetary system (IDA and IMF 2000). To
alleviate poverty, the government seeks to increasing agricultural productivity,
improving gender equity, and ameliorating social services infrastructure and delivery.
The government has established an institutional framework (including a Poverty
Observatory unit within the Ministry of Finance) for monitoring progress in social
services delivery. There is reason for hope that there will be light at the end of the fiscal
adjustment tunnel.
While Rwanda forges ahead with economic reform and social reconstruction, Burundi is
still struggling with ethnic violence and sectarian politics. The Burundian economy
continues to deteriorate and poverty continues to rise, even as the government continues
to build its military apparatus. In the meantime, issues of economic and social reform do
not seem to be regarded with much urgency among the rival leaders in the peace
negotiation process (Ndikumana 2000). There is a real danger that the country can
degenerate in a vicious cycle of increasing insecurity and deepening poverty.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated various ways in which fiscal policy relates to conflict and its
role in post-conflict reconstruction. The paper focused on public expenditure
management, emphasizing the allocation of public money between military/security
expenditures and socially productive investments. Most of the findings and conclusions
are applicable to other developing countries, especially those in conflict or evolving
from conflict.
The relationship between fiscal policy and conflict is complex. Using the cases of
Burundi and Rwanda, this paper has argued that bad public expenditure management,
especially military-intensive fiscal policy can be socially destabilizing through various
channels, including predation, exclusion, oppression, repression, and political and
economic alienation. The buildup of the military/security apparatus is economically and
politically costly. Higher military expenditures are associated with depressed social
12 See Box 1 in the appendix for some details.15
services and underinvestment in public infrastructure. Politically, military-intensive
management of public money implies a deepening of the socio-political gap between the
ruling group and disenfranchised segments of the population. When the security
apparatus is used for oppressive and repressive purposes, this fuels social tensions and
saws the seeds for violent conflict.
The cases of Burundi and Rwanda are an illustration of the complex relationships
between economic performance and ethnic conflict. The experience of these two
countries shows that while ethnic conflict can cause economic collapse, economic
distress also can fuel ethnic conflict. Evidence from these two countries shows that the
conflicts of the 1990s accentuated the collapse of two economies whose ailments have
deeper-seated structural roots. These economies are not robust to shocks, their
production system is not diversified, and most importantly, development policy has
neglected the rural sector even though it constitutes the basis for the livelihood of the
majority of the population.
Fiscal policy in post-conflict reconstruction must have a clear poverty alleviation
dimension. The success of this agenda depends on four important factors. First, total
public expenditures must increase systematically and remain high for a sustained period
to jump-start the economy, thereby raising aggregate demand and incomes, and
broadening the tax base. Second, as public expenditures increase, resources must be
shifted away from military/security towards economic infrastructure and socially
productive investments, such as education, health care (especially preventive care),
drinking water supply, nutrition programs, etc. The revitalization of the rural sector is
key to economic progress in Burundi and Rwanda. Third, government revenues must
increase to meet higher public expenditures and minimize deficits. The increase in fiscal
revenues will require investment in administrative capacity (human capital and
technology), reform of the tax system and enforcement of accountability to minimize
leaks, and broadening the tax base through economic diversification. Fourth, the
reconstruction agenda needs to be supported by higher external funding in the form of
development aid and debt relief. However, foreign resources must explicitly target
poverty alleviation programs. Moreover, external funding must be a complement as well
as a stimulant for domestic resource mobilization; aid must “crowd in” rather than
“crowd out” domestic resources.
The strategies for reconstruction and poverty reduction discussed in this paper will be
impossible to implement without a stable developmental state. Reconstruction must go
hand in hand with efforts to establish a new governance system that is broad-based
(non-sectarian) and democratic. Development assistance partners can use their leverage
to enforce accountability in the management of public money and to foster reform of the
governance structure.16
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Some aggregate indicators for Rwanda
Indicator Average
1980s
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP per capita (at 1995$) 317 292 277 285 255 154 201 221 213 227
% annual change -4.7 -5.2 3.0 -10.6 -39.7 30.8 10.2 -3.9 6.7
CPI 28.9 34.1 40.8 44.7 50.3 Na 100.0 107.4 120.3 127.8
% annual change 4.2 19.6 9.6 12.4 Na na 7.4 12.0 6.2
Food production (index 1989-91=100) 98.0 100.4 96.9 92.8 82.5 66.4 72.9 75.8 79.9 81.6
% annual change -2.2 -3.5 -4.2 -11.1 -19.5 9.8 4.0 5.4 2.1
Manufacturing value added
(million 1995 $)
215 233 193 193 160 104 204 235 274 303
% annual change -1.9 -17.3 0.0 -16.9 -34.7 94.8 15.1 16.6 10.4
Coffee exports (metric tons) 32824 45579 37642 33851 29667 1800 8248 15900 11820 Na
% annual change 27.3 -17.4 -10.1 -12.4 -93.9 358.2 92.8 -25.7 Na
Agricultural exports (million $) 94 95 85 60 52 14 41 39 38 na
% annual change -15.9 -10.2 -29.2 -13.0 -73.2 197.2 -5.7 -2.8 na
Sources: World Bank (2000) World Development Indicators 2000; World Bank (2000) Africa Data Base 2000; IMF (2000) “Rwanda: Recent economic developments,” IMF Staff
Country Report No. 4.Table 2
Some aggregate indicators for Burundi
Indicator Average
1980s
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP per capita (at 1995 $) 194 206 211 207 191 179 163 146 143 147
% annual change 0.6 2.2 -1.8 -8.0 -6.0 -9.2 -10.3 -1.7 2.7
CPI 41.9 60.0 65.4 66.6 73.0 83.8 100.0 126.4 165.8 186.5
% annual change 7.0 9.0 1.8 9.7 14.9 19.3 26.4 31.1 12.5
Food production (index
1989-91=100)
87.8 102.5 105.0 107.7 106.2 89.8 97.8 98.4 97.3 91.8
% annual change 10.8 2.4 2.6 -1.4 -15.4 8.9 0.6 -1.1 -5.7
Manufacturing value added (million 1995
$)
119 156 162 172 141 134 105 88 85 87
% annual change 9.6 4.2 6.4 -18.2 -4.6 -21.8 -16.4 -2.8 2.0
Coffee exports (metric tons) 29355 33501 41163 39991 22770 28732 28500 13400 31700 na
% annual change 15.2 22.9 -2.8 -43.1 26.2 -0.8 -53.0 136.6 na
Agricultural exports (million $) 94 69 88 66 53 113 96 32 81 na
% annual change -4.8 27.2 -24.6 -20.0 113.0 -15.3 -66.4 152.4 na
Sources: World Bank (2000) World Development Indicators 2000; World Bank (2000) Africa Data Base 2000; IMF (2000) “Burundi: Statistical annex,” Washington DC (April).Table 3
International trade and tax from international trade
Burundi
Year Trade taxes
(% of current revenue)
Trade taxes




(% of real GDP)
Real volume of trade
(% of real GDP)
1990 19.2 10.1 8.4 22.2 30.7
1991 23.5 13.4 9.7 22.2 31.9
1992 23.6 13.0 11.4 21.4 32.8
1993 20.9 11.0 10.1 22.9 33.1
1994 25.6 14.2 8.9 25.4 34.3
1995 26.3 12.6 12.9 27.3 40.2
1996 17.2 13.7 7.1 14.3 21.4
1997 15.7 6.5 14.4 18.4 32.8
Average 1970s 46.0 18.5 9.8 21.9 31.6
Average 1980s 30.9 13.1 9.4 27.1 36.5
Average 1990s 21.5 11.8 10.4 21.8 32.1
Rwanda
Year Trade taxes
(% of current revenue)
Trade taxes




(% of real GDP)
Real volume of trade
(% of real GDP)
1990 25.7 13.4 10.6 10.2 20.8
1991 31.8 11.8 10.0 19.3 29.3
1992 31.1 12.0 8.7 18.7 27.4
1993 27.8 7.9 8.2 23.7 31.9
1994 36.6 2.2 6.4 53.8 60.2
1995 38.5 8.3 5.2 26.0 31.2
1996 29.2 9.0 6.4 23.6 29.9
1997 31.8 8.8 7.4 30.0 37.4
Average 1970s 52.6 (1974-79) 29.8 9.5 8.7 18.2
Average 1980s na na 10.9 12.6 23.5
Average 1990s 31.6 9.2 7.8 25.7 33.5
Sources: World Development Indicators 2000; IMF (2000a); Banque de la République du Burundi (1990).Table 4
Rwanda: Government revenue and expenditures
Indicator Average
1980s
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Government expenditures (% of GDP) na 18.9 19.9 20.1 24.4 16.0 20.6 22.1 19.5 18.6
% annual change na na 5.1 0.9 21.2 -34.3 28.8 7.3 -11.8 -4.6
Tax revenue (% of GDP) na 9.5 9.8 9.3 Na 0.6 6.4 8.4 10.3 10.4
% annual change na na 2.6 -5.1 Na Na 966.7 31.3 22.6 1.0
Capital expenditures (% gvt. expenditures) 32.6 33.1 37.3 25.9 Na 16.5 39.9 41.3 42.1 36.1
% annual change na 1.6 12.7 -30.7 Na Na 141.8 3.5 1.9 -14.3
Education expenditures (% of GDP) 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
% annual change na -6.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.2 1.0 -1.4 0.1 0.5
Health expenditures (% of GDP) na 1.9 na na Na Na na na 2.1 0.4
% annual change na na na na Na Na na na na na
Military expenditures (% gvt. expenditures) 4.1 19.8 27.9 21.7 18.9 25.7 34.9 23.1 22.2 na
% annual change na 122.5 40.9 -22.2 -12.9 36.0 35.8 -33.8 -3.9 na
Budget deficit (% of GDP) -2.5 -5.3 -3.2 -5.5 -6.9 -19.1 -8.0 -24.5 -13.8 -18.4
% annual change na 61.3 -40.3 74.5 26.0 175.1 -58.1 206.3 -43.7 33.3
Aid per capita (US $) 31 42 51 48 47 115 110 69 29 43
% annual change na 23.6 20.7 -5.4 -1.2 142.8 -4.3 -36.8 -58.1 48.5
Sources: World Bank (2000) World Development Indicators 2000; World Bank (2000) Africa Data Base 2000; IMF (2000) “Rwanda: Recent economic developments,”
IMF Staff Country Report No. 4.Table 5
Burundi: Government revenue and expenditures
Indicator Average
1980s
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Government expenditures (% of GDP) na na 28.7 33.6 31.2 28.4 30.6 27.7 24.0 na
% annual change na na na 17.0 -7.1 -9.1 7.7 -9.5 -13.4 na
Tax revenue (% of GDP) na na 16.3 16.3 15.7 17.0 17.9 14.2 12.7 na
% annual change na na na 0.1 -4.2 8.4 5.7 -21.0 -10.3 na
Capital expenditure (% gvt. expenditures) na na 41.0 45.0 43.1 33.4 41.7 27.9 15.3 25.3
% annual change na na na 9.8 -4.2 -22.5 24.9 -33.1 -45.4 65.9
Education expenditures (% of GDP) 2.7 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.0 3.0 3.0
% annual change na 1.9 3.5 4.3 18.4 -8.1 -3.2 -19.1 0.0 0.0
Health expenditures (% of GDP) na 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 0.6
% annual change na na 6.2 -3.1 9.4 -1.3 13.5 7.6 -4.3 -57.8
Military expenditures (% gvt. expenditures) 7.2 8.7 8.1 7.8 8.7 12.5 15.1 20.6 25.8 na
% annual change na -5.4 -6.9 -3.7 11.5 43.7 20.8 36.4 25.2 na
Budget deficit (% of GDP) -4.8 na -3.3 -7.1 -3.8 -3.2 -3.0 -7.8 -5.5 na
% annual change na na na 114.7 -45.9 -16.2 -6.5 159.5 -29.6 na
Aid per capita (US $) 33 48 46 54 37 52 47 18 9 12
% annual change na 23.9 -4.9 17.4 -31.7 40.5 -9.8 -62.2 -50.4 33.4
Sources: World Bank (2000) World Development Indicators 2000; World Bank (2000) Africa Data Base 2000; IMF (2000) “Burundi: Statistical annex,” Washington DC
(April).Table 6
Government size and performance: Burundi and Rwanda compared to other conflict African countries, 1985-1997
Country
/P e r i o d
Expenditure
(G)


































Entire period of 1985-1997
Burundi NA NA NA 14.3 2.9 NA NA NA 38.2 16.1 25.5
Rwanda NA NA NA 19.6 3.3 NA NA NA 52.5 NA NA
Congo, Rep. NA NA NA 10.2 5.7 NA NA NA 76.3 NA 16.5
DRC 13.7 -4.4 6.5 20.7 0.9 31.9 NA 43.9 10.4 18.5 36.2
Ethiopia 24.1 -6.6 12.3 22.6 2.7 37.4 3.9 47.9 16.9 23.1 17.5
Mozambique NA NA NA 24.1 3.4 NA NA NA 62.4 NA NA
Sierra Leone 13.7 -5.1 7.1 17.2 1.1 20.9 NA 110.4 32.0 28.9 40.5
Sudan NA NA NA 54.9 NA NA NA NA 26.2 NA NA
Uganda NA NA NA 25.8 2.4 NA NA NA 32.8 NA NA
SSA 28.1 -3.7 17.9 11.8 4.3 29.1 4.0 44.5 27.5 22.9 30.8
Sub-period of 1992-1997 (1985-91 not reported in this table)
Burundi 29.2 -5.1 NA 15.1 2.8 25.2 6.3 73.1 35.9 15.6 21.5
Rwanda 20.4 -12.9 NA 24.4 3.3 26.5 NA NA 69.6 6.9 32.5
Congo, Rep. 35.0 -9.8 10.8 9.6 6.1 35.6 51.8 30.7 93.8 13.1 16.5
DRC 11.8 -5.3 3.8 27.7 0.8 36.7 NA 39.6 4.7 21.6 31.5
Ethiopia NA NA NA 11.2 2.8 NA 3.9 NA 16.6 NA NA
Mozambique NA NA NA 13.9 3.4 NA NA NA 71.8 NA NA
Sierra Leone 17.1 -5.2 10.1 24.8 1.0 19.2 NA 129.9 42.0 34.3 41.2
Sudan NA NA NA 51.6 NA NA NA NA 12.6 NA NA
Uganda NA NA NA 17.8 2.1 NA NA NA 38.8 NA NA
SSA 29.3 -3.8 18.7 11.5 4.9 29.8 6.8 40.2 27.9 23.4 29.8
Source: Author’s computations using data from World Development Indicators 2000; Africa Data Base 2000; IMF (2000) “Burundi: Statistical annex,” Washington DC (April);
IMF (2000) “Rwanda: Recent economic developments,” IMF Staff Country Report No. 4; Banque de la République du Burundi (1990).
G = total government expenditures; SOE = state-owned enterprises (the figures show the activity of SOE as % of GDP).Table 7









Total debt stock (million, constant 1995 $) 71 566 1074 1106
Net flows on debt (million, constant 1995 $) 18 89 64 11
Total debt service (million, constant 1995 $) 10 31 42 32
Total debt/ GNP (EDT/GNP%) 8.2 44.8 97.2 118.8
Debt service/ exports (TDS/XGS %) NA 23.5 41.1 38.7
Interest payments/ exports (INT/XGS%) NA 9.6 14.5 11.8









Total debt stock (million, constant 1995 $) 95 463 897 1091
Net flows on debt (million, constant 1995 $) 27 64 55 73
Total debt service (million, constant 1995 $) 5 19 19 20
Total debt/ GNP (EDT/GNP%) 9.0 21.8 46.0 66.5
Debt service/ exports (TDS/XGS %) 2.2 10.0 16.7 20.0
Interest payments/ exports (INT/XGS%) 0.3 4.6 8.7 8.7
Grant element (% of total debt) 65.8 69.0 61.7 82.1




Total debt stock (million, constant 1995 $) NA 84530 207864 227730
Net flows on debt (million, constant 1995 $) 5188 13994 6282 3615
Total debt service (million, constant 1995 $) NA 9296 11965 14875
Total debt/ GNP (EDT/GNP%) NA 23.5 72.4 72.9
Debt service/ exports (TDS/XGS %) NA 7.2 13.8 14.7
Interest payments/ exports (INT/XGS%) NA 3.8 6.6 5.3
Grant element (% of total debt) 47.5 21.7 46.8 45.1
Source: Global Development Finance 2000. Nominal debt values are deflated into real using the US PPI
(from the International Financial Statistics, December 1999 CDROM edition).Table A1
Government size and performance: SSA vs. other developing regions, 1985-1997
Region/Period Expenditure
(G)



































Asia 24.3 -2.5 14.8 12.8* 4.0* 21.2 19.3 21.8 5.2 28.6 18.1
Dev. America 20.8 -1.7 15.8 11.7* 3.5 27.1 140.4 11.0 8.1 32.3 16.3
Middle East 37.9 -5.4 9.0 31.8 4.4* 32.9 25.5 2.6 11.5 10.2 11.9
SSA 28.1 -3.7 17.8 12.0 4.3 29.1 4.0 44.5 27.5 22.9 30.8
1986-1991
Asia 25.2* -3.1* 14.5 12.9* 4.0* 22.4 11.4 21.5 5.6 28.4 20.1
Dev. America 20.0 -2.4 14.8 13.8* 3.4 27.6* 59.2 12.6 7.9 29.9 17.4
Middle East 40.8 -3.9* 8.7 37.9 4.4 33.8 43.5 2.2 12.2 10.1 8.4
SSA 27.4 -3.4 17.4 12.8 3.9 29.0 1.3 47.7 28.3 22.8 30.9
1992-1997
Asia 23.4 -1.6 15.3 12.6* 4.0 19.7 29.1 22.9 5.0 28.7 16.1
Dev. America 21.4 -0.7 16.8* 9.6 3.5 26.8 233.3 10.0 8.6 34.5 14.9
Middle East 35.6 -6.8 9.4 26.7 4.4* 32.7* 13.3 2.9 10.6 10.9 15.1
SSA 29.3 -3.7 18.7 11.5 4.9 29.8 6.8 40.8 27.9 23.8 29.8
Source: Author’s computations using data from World Development Indicators 2000.
Notes: The * on a mean indicates that the mean is not statistically different from SSA’s mean at the 5% significance level.
a The means for aid and health expenditures per capita are weighted averages; all other means in the table are simple means.
G = total government expenditures; SOE = state-owned enterprises (the figures show the activity of SOE as % of GDP)Table A2
















1997 (at 1995 US
$)
Mauritius 1.3 17.1 22.7 -1.3 4.6 3860
Côte d’Ivoire 4.1 8.5 25.1 -1.2 -1.4 796
Ghana 4.3 18.5 14.9 -0.7 1.4 392
Malawi 4.4 25.2 30.3 -6.3 0.0 165
Swaziland 6.1 26.1 27.0 0.3 2.1 1425
Equatorial Guinea 6.2 na na Na 5.0 887
Madagascar 6.8 37.4 17.4 -3.5 -1.6 236
Guinea 7.0 50.5 21.5 -3.2 1.2 582
Niger 7.1 na na Na -2.0 205
Zambia 7.9 25.4 34.1 -15.0 -1.9 405
Guinea Bissau 8.1 63.7 50.4 -19.2 1.7 246
Kenya 8.1 14.3 28.0 -4.0 0.0 336
Mali 8.1 2.6 28.2 -6.3 0.1 265
Senegal 8.7 na na Na -0.5 564
Lesotho 8.9 37.1 56.3 -2.0 4.5 515
Gabon 10.0 42.5 29.9 -0.8 0.1 4649
Congo, Rep. 10.2 na na Na -2.1 815
Benin 10.3 na na Na 0.0 387
Cameroon 10.7 24.1 18.8 -2.0 -4.9 631
Tanzania 10.7 20.1 na Na -0.1 172
South Africa 10.7 7.6 30.5 -5.2 -0.8 3967
Botswana 10.9 18.8 33.4 10.8 3.5 3554
Nigeria 11.4 39.0 19.3 -5.2 1.2 258
Togo 11.4 31.6 34.8 -2.9 -1.8 345
Central African Republic 12.5 na na Na -2.2 331Table A2 (continued)














1997 (at 1995 US
$)
Mauritania 12.8 na Na Na -0.2 475
Zimbabwe 12.8 9.5 30.7 -6.8 0.2 700
Chad 13.4 61.4 21.6 -3.8 -0.5 219
Burundi 14.3 34.4 Na Na -2.7 143
Gambia 14.6 34.2 23.6 -0.8 -0.9 347
Burkina Faso 15.3 24.0 14.6 0.4 0.5 250
Sierra Leone 17.2 27.2 13.7 -5.1 -4.5 153
Rwanda 19.6 33.1 Na Na -4.6 213
Congo, DRC 20.7 14.3 13.7 -4.4 -8.2 127
Ethiopia 22.6 19.3 24.1 -6.6 0.8 114
Mozambique 24.1 Na Na Na 2.8 172
Uganda 25.8 na Na Na 3.2 324
Sudan 54.9 na Na Na 2.6 288
Source: Author’s computation with data from World Development Indicators 2000; IMF (2000) “Burundi: Statistical annex,” Washington D.C. (April); IMF (2000) “Rwanda:
Recent economic developments,” IMF Staff Country Report No. 4.
G = total government expenditures; Countries are ranked by ascending order of military expenditures. Shaded countries are conflict or post-conflict countries.Table A3
HIPC status and debt ratios for sub-Saharan African low-income countries
Country and status TDS relief
(million $)
TDS/XGS INT/XGS INT/GNP EDT/XGS EDT/GNP
Approved for debt relief end-2000
Benin* 500 8.0 3.4 1.1 243.3 76.1
Burkina Faso 700 11.3 4.1 0.8 295.2 53.6
Cameroon 2,000 22.1 10.5 2.9 424.0 116.5
Gambia* 91 12.1 2.8 1.6 201.2 114.7
Guinea 800 19.9 6.8 1.4 444.0 92.7
Guinea-Bissau 790 32.7 14.3 2.1 2697.3 404.5
Madagascar 1,500 14.7 5.8 1.4 524.2 122.8
Malawi 1,000 17.1 5.9 1.7 411.6 116.9
Mali 900 13.8 5.6 1.5 459.9 121.5
Mauritania 1,100 24.4 8.5 3.9 527.3 242.7
Mozambique 4,300 24.2 10.1 2.0 1433.6 269.7
Niger 890 17.9 4.1 0.7 483.6 83.3
Rwanda 810 17.8 7.8 0.6 980.5 68.9
Sao Tome and Principe 200 28.4 13.6 3.8 2231.6 615.6
Senegal* 900 19.0 6.8 2.3 250.1 84.2
Tanzania 3,000 17.8 6.8 1.4 575.4 117.4
Uganda 2,000 20.5 5.3 0.6 511.3 60.9
Zambia 3,800 59.3 14.5 6.2 532.2 210.2
Post-2000 decision
Burundi 37.6 11.5 1.1 1337.1 121.4
Central African Republic 11.4 3.4 0.5 548.4 88.2
Chad* 9.6 3.6 0.7 330.3 65.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.5 1.0 0.3 771.5 232.9
Congo, Rep. 11.1 6.2 5.2 371.5 302.8
Cote d'Ivoire 25.7 10.8 5.6 346.7 180.0
Ethiopia 20.5 5.9 0.9 1113.2 167.2
Sierra Leone 35.9 10.8 1.6 1046.8 153.4
Sudan 9.0 1.7 0.2 2574.3 229.1
Togo* 6.7 2.4 1.2 210.4 101.3
No decision date set as of end-2000
Angola 21.1 7.2 8.6 260.3 336.9
Comoros 6.4 1.4 0.3 391.6 99.3
Eritrea** 0.4 0.4 0.1 25.3 9.9
Kenya* 24.8 8.1 2.5 234.9 72.0
Lesotho** 6.5 2.6 1.4 100.8 55.7
Nigeria 11.7 5.2 2.5 211.8 95.3
Zimbabwe* 26.4 8.1 3.2 172.0 68.7Source: Global Development Finance 2000; World Development Indicators 2000. Countries with *, ** are
moderately indebted and less indebted, respectively; all others are severely indebted (January
2000 classification). Data are missing for Somalia (severely indebted) and Liberia (not classified
by indebtedness); both are in post-2000 decision category. Ghana (moderately indebted) is not
seeking debt relief. EDT = total debt stock; TDS = total debt service; INT = interest payment;
XGS = exports of goods and services; GNP = gross national product.
Box 1
Some important recent fiscal reform measures in Rwanda, 1997-1999
· 1997: Establishment of the Rwanda Revenue Authority, an autonomous institution, with its own
budget. Its mission is to become a “professional organization characterized by integrity and
efficiency and dedicated to upgrading the quality of service provided to the taxpaying public” (IMF
2000a). Operational since January 1998, the RRA is responsible for tax and customs administration,
audit and investigation.
· 1998: Civil service reform was initiated. Its objectives include replacement of unqualified civil
servants, removal of ‘ghost’ workers, adjustment (increase) in salaries.
· 1998: Establishment of an expenditure monitoring system, including monitoring of social sector
budgets using selected performance indicators. A Poverty Observatory unit was established in the
Ministry of Finance to monitor progress in meeting targets in poverty and social indicators. A social
sector expenditure review was conducted in 1998/1999 focusing education, health, water supply,
sanitation, and other social services. While the evidence from this survey and other sources shows
widespread poverty, there is some evidence that budget allocations to social sectors are increasing:
from 2.5% of GDP in 1997 to 3.8% in 1999 and 3.9% in 2000.
· 1998: Establishment of the Central Project and External Financing Bureau whose mission is to
improve the coordination of investment within the Ministry of Finance. With assistance from the
African Development Bank, the government established a 3-year rolling public investment program
aimed at strengthening the preparation and monitoring of public investment projects.
· 1998: Beginning of progressive reduction in maximum tariff rates from 60% to 40% in 1998 and to
25% in 1999.
· 1998/1999: Increase in some taxes to offset the decline in tax revenue. These include the turnover tax
rate (from 10% to 15%) and the excise tax rate.
· 1998: Coffee export tax converted into an ad valorem tax at 16%.
· 1999: Public enterprises subject to income tax.
· 1998-December 2001: target period for completion of privatization of public enterprises.
Source: IDA and IMF (2000) “Rwanda: Preliminary Document on the Enhanced Initiative for Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries.” Washington D.C.: IDA and IMF (July); IMF (2000) “Rwanda:
Enhanced structural adjustment facility”, Economic and Financial Policy Framework Paper for
1998/99, 2000/01; IMF (2000) “Rwanda: Recent Economic Developments”, IMF Staff Country
Report No. 4 (January).Figure 1
















Source: World Development Indicators 2000.Figure 2













1993: Burundi crisis begins
1990: Rwanda, RPF
ii
1972: Burundi civil war
Source: World Development Indicators 2000.Figure 3
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Source: Author’s calculations from World Development Indicators 2000; Banque de la République du Burundi (1990).Figure 4
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Burundi: military Rwanda: military Burundi: education Rwanda: education
Sources: Education: World Development Indicators 2000. Military expenditures: SIPRI Yearbook, various issues 1980 to 2000.Figure 5
Military spending, state legitimacy and the cycle of instability
Questionable rights High insecurity
to rule: illegitimate state of “sovereign” ruler






Trade-off between military/security and social capital
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weighted average for 39 SSA
Source: Nominal debt figures (from World development Indicators 2000) are deflated to real values using the US producer price index (from International Financial Statistics,
December 1999 CDROM edition).Figure 8
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